In this billing dispute between a municipal electric service and an industrial customer, the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine whether the Borough was permitted to “back-bill” customers following the discovery of significant under-billing, and whether the Borough could impose a municipal lien for the amount owed. In affirming the determination of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, the Commonwealth Court concluded that no back-billing was permitted pursuant to the municipality’s applicable ordinance, and that such a contractual agreement was not a proper basis for a municipal lien.
This blog features case law related to real estate, land use, zoning, and municipal law in Pennsylvania
Category: Municipal Law (Page 2 of 9)
In this case out of Elk County, the Third Circuit was presented with an appeal from the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, challenging the District Court’s decision to deny an effort by third parties to intervene in defense of an ordinance that had already been repealed by the local municipality. In affirming the District Court’s order, the Court found the matter was made moot by the repeal of the ordinance, and no abuse of discretion had occurred in denying intervention.
Cornell applied to the Borough for building permits to construct detached single-family homes on a four-lot subdivision. Before submitting, Cornell met with the Borough Manager and the company that performed building inspections (the “Building Inspector”) to discuss construction. The Borough informed Cornell that local ordinances did not require automatic sprinkler systems in detached single-family residences. Cornell thereafter obtained building permits. The permit applications stated the residences would be constructed with pre-engineered wood roof trusses and would not have automatic sprinklers. The Building Inspector visited the site throughout construction, and performed a final inspection when the first residence was completed. The Building Inspector told the Borough to issue the certificate of occupancy, but the Borough refused on the basis that automatic sprinklers were required in homes constructed with pre-engineered wood roof trusses. The Building Inspector thereafter refused to perform final inspections of the remaining residences until sprinklers were installed. Cornell filed suit against the Borough and Building Inspector in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County asserting claims for: (1) breach of contract; (2) promissory estoppel; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) violation of the equal protection clause of the US Constitution; and (5) violation of the equal protection clause of the Pennsylvania constitution. The Borough asserted that Cornell’s allegations, while couched as contractual or quasi-contractual claims, were “clearly based upon negligence” and, thus, were barred by the Tort Claims Act. The Building Inspector argued it had acted as the Borough’s employee in its capacity as the appointed building inspector, and was therefore also immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted the Borough and Building Inspector’s motions for summary judgment, and rejected Cornell’s contract claims. The trial court reasoned the alleged contractual “promise” was unenforceable because the permits were freely revocable by the Borough. It further concluded the promissory estoppel claim was actually a negligence claim, and it and the negligent misrepresentation claim were barred by the Tort Claims Act. Lastly it rejected the equal protection claims. Cornell appealed.
In this opinion by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the Court was asked to determine whether three statutory provisions — the “Donated or Dedicated Property Act” (“DDPA”), the “Project 70 Land Acquisition and Borrowing Act” (“Project 70 Act”), and the Eminent Domain Code — permitted Downingtown Borough (the “Borough”) to sell Borough owned and maintained parkland to private Developers, and to grant Developers easements over portions retained by the Borough. In reversing and remanding the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Court held the Eminent Domain Code was inapplicable to the Borough’s right to sell properties acquired by condemnation, and court approval was required to sell properties acquired with Project 70 Act funds and to grant easements across park land pursuant to DDPA.
In this appeal out of Berks County, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to construe the language of the utility service facilities exception (“Utility Exception”) to governmental immunity contained in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“Tort Claims Act”). Finding the Commonwealth Court erred by not applying the Utility Exception, the Court reversed.
In this direct appeal from a decision of the Commonwealth Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the text of the Environmental Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution (Art. 1, § 27) was the appropriate standard of judicial review for determining the constitutionality of Commonwealth agency actions. In so ruling, the Court expressly rejected the balancing test established by the Commonwealth Court in Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. 1973), which had been used for decades to determine whether state action was in violation of the Environmental Rights Amendment.
In this appeal from the final determination of the Office of Open Records (“OOR”) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that motor vehicle recordings (“MVRs”) created by Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) officers responding to an auto accident were not per se protected from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”) as “criminal investigative records,” nor were they per se protected “investigative records” under the Criminal History Record Information Act (“CHRIA”).
In this petition to enforce a final determination of the Office of Open Records (“OOR”) the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine how can enforce OOR determinations where no appeal has been taken of that determination. The Court concluded that a mandamus action, not a petition to enforce, was the appropriate legal vehicle, but found no error in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County’s denial of the petition on the merits.
In this appeal from a determination of the Office of Open Records (OOR), the Commonwealth Court found that information voluntarily submitted to a Commonwealth agency and which was not needed by the agency to perform its duties, did not constitute a “record” under the RTKL. As such, the requested information did not have to be disclosed.
In this challenge of the constitutionality of an ordinance restricting protests and picketing within 20 feet of the entrance to a healthcare facility, the Third Circuit remanded the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit found that the District Court had improperly placed the burden of demonstrating likelihood of success on the plaintiffs, rather than the municipality, as is required in First Amendment cases.
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