The DiMattias were issued a zoning violation notice for using a garage and driveway on a residential property they owned in the Township’s R-1 Low Density Residential Zoning District to prepare, repair, and transport race cars. When Landowners purchased the Property in 2009, it contained a single-family detached residence and two garages. Landowners erected a large pole barn in 2010, and rented out the residence. In November 2014 the Township issued a notice of violation alleging Landowners were servicing vehicles on the Property from an automobile repair business they owned, and were working on race cars on the Property. The notice directed Landowners to cease and desist their use of the garages and driveway for “servicing vehicles, working on race cars and trailer storage.” Landowners appealed the violation notice to the Township’s Zoning Hearing Board (“ZHB”). The ZHB sustained Landowners’ appeal related to servicing vehicles from their business, but denied it as to their race car activities. The ZHB concluded that their race car activities did not qualify as an accessory use in the R-1 district. Landowners appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, which affirmed the ZHB decision, and Landowners appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
This blog features case law related to real estate, land use, zoning, and municipal law in Pennsylvania
Tag: J. Colins
In this dispute over a property owner’s ability to construct an in-ground pool, the Commonwealth Court ruled that provisions in a property association’s rules and regulations that are not based upon an official resolution of the association’s board, cannot constrain a property owner’s use of their property.
In this zoning appeal originating before the Zoning Board of Adjustment in Philadelphia, the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine the applicability of the pending ordinance doctrine when post submission revisions have been made to plans after the proposed zoning amendment is deemed pending by the Zoning Ordinance. In finding that the doctrine did not apply, the court concluded that the determination of the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections (“L&I”) that the application was complete when filed, overcame objecting neighbors’ arguments that the revisions made the doctrine applicable.
In the first of two cases relating to the subject property, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County affirming the London Grove Township Zoning Hearing Board’s (“ZHB”) denial of a variance to Delchester Developers (“Delchester”) to develop two adjoining properties. The Court concluded that the ZHB had properly interpreted its zoning ordinance, that Delchester’s validity challenge of the Borough’s stormwater ordinance was not within the ZHB’s jurisdiction, and the Township’s “net out” provision was neither a violation of due process nor an illegal taking.
In this takings case out of Bucks County, the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine whether the inadvertent redirection of storm water onto a property constituted a de facto taking that would require the municipality to pay just compensation. In concluding the resultant flooding did not rise to the level of a de facto taking, the Court concluded that although the municipality had intentionally redirected runoff, the choice of discharge locations had not been intentional and did not warrant an award of just compensation.
In this decision out of Allegheny County the Commonwealth Court was presented with the question of whether the volunteering of time or services, and the permitting of temporary government use of property without compensation constitutes a “donation” to a government agency that falls under the donor exception to the Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”). In reversing the final determination of the Office of Open Records (“OOR”), the court found that because there was no express limitation on the type of donations exempted from disclosure within the RTKL, such donations were exempt from disclosure.
The Commonwealth Court was presented with an appeal from a validity challenge asserting “apartments” were either excluded from the municipality, or the municipality failed to accommodate its fair share of multi-family housing. In determining that the challenge was appropriately dismissed, the court concluded that the economic infeasibility of a particular variation of a use did not render the entire use infeasible, and that zoned and actively used agricultural land could not be considered “undeveloped” when determining whether a municipality was underdeveloped.
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