This appeal required the Commonwealth Court to determine if a Philadelphia City Council member had standing to challenge the Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment’s (the Board) grant of a variance to create a private driveway. More specifically, the court had to decide whether or not the First Class City Home Rule Act (the HRA), the Philadelphia Zoning Code (the Code), or the challenger’s status as a council member granted him standing. The court held that the plain language of the HRA and the Code grants standing to the city council only as a single government body, and it further held that there was no “legislative standing” because the city council’s authority to regulate public streets was not impaired by the granting of this particular variance.
Tag: J. Hearthway
This case required the Commonwealth Court to determine whether the Charlestown Township Board of Supervisors (the Board) had standing to appeal a trial court’s order that reversed the Board’s decision to deny a conditional use application. In holding that the Board did have standing to appeal, the court relied on important differences between boards of supervisors and zoning hearing boards.
California University of Pennsylvania (the “University”) petitioned the Commonwealth Court for review of a final determination made by Pennsylvania’s Office of Open Records (OOR) in January 2017. The final determination held that records relating to the University’s investigation of a structural failure in an on-campus parking garage were recoverable. The Commonwealth Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the ORR’s final determination. Specifically, the Commonwealth Court held that the University failed to show that certain records were exempt from disclosure under Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law (the “RTKL”) as records of a noncriminal investigation or as records of predecisional deliberations. However, the Commonwealth Court did remand potentially privileged records to OOR for an in camera review.
In this appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine whether § 617 of the Municipalities Planning Code (“MPC”) permits a private cause of action to enforce a SALDO violation. In reversing the trial court’s determination, the Court held that MPC § 617 permits private enforcement actions for violations of any ordinance established pursuant to the MPC.
In this zoning appeal out of Alleghany County, the Commonwealth Court was asked whether preservation requirements imposed by a government agency on property that it owned, may constitute an unnecessary hardship to justify a variance. In concluding such a hardship is self-imposed and does not warrant a variance, the court focused on the fact that no legal authority required preservation, and that the more appropriate solution was for the City to rezone the site rather than have the applicant seek a variance.
In this zoning appeal out of Bucks County. the Commonwealth Court was asked whether the existence of man-made improvements that exceeded the permitted impervious coverage on a property could constitute a sufficient hardship to warrant the issuance of a variance. In concluding that such improvements could not, the court held that generally for a unique condition to warrant a variance it must relate to the physical conditions of the land itself and not to man-made improvements, such as poured asphalt and concrete.
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