The Commonwealth Court was asked to assess the constitutionality of a provision of the Philadelphia city code regulating “adult cabaret.” The court found that the language of the ordinance was neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague.
This blog features case law related to real estate, land use, zoning, and municipal law in Pennsylvania
Tag: Zoning
In this case, the Commonwealth Court had to decide whether a board of supervisors was wrong to consider and approve a land development plan prior to the developer obtaining zoning relief. Because the municipality’s subdivision and land development ordinance (“SALDO”) did not require that a land development applicant obtain zoning relief first, the board of supervisors did not err by considering and approving the land development plans.
In this zoning appeal out of Alleghany County, the Commonwealth Court was asked whether preservation requirements imposed by a government agency on property that it owned, may constitute an unnecessary hardship to justify a variance. In concluding such a hardship is self-imposed and does not warrant a variance, the court focused on the fact that no legal authority required preservation, and that the more appropriate solution was for the City to rezone the site rather than have the applicant seek a variance.
In this appeal of a special exception denial by the City of Scranton’s Zoning Hearing Board (“ZHB”), the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine what type of testimony is required to support such a denial based on general detrimental effects to health, safety, and welfare. In reversing the ZHB’s decision, the Court concluded that lay testimony based solely on personal opinions, bald assertions, and speculation were insufficient grounds for denial.
In this zoning appeal out of Bucks County. the Commonwealth Court was asked whether the existence of man-made improvements that exceeded the permitted impervious coverage on a property could constitute a sufficient hardship to warrant the issuance of a variance. In concluding that such improvements could not, the court held that generally for a unique condition to warrant a variance it must relate to the physical conditions of the land itself and not to man-made improvements, such as poured asphalt and concrete.
On July 21, 2016, the Department of Justice has filed a complaint against Bensalem Township for allegedly giving a proposed mosque harsher zoning treatment than similar institutions. The claims arise under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5. RLUIPA prohibits a government from imposing burdensome zoning restrictions on religious groups.
This case required the Commonwealth Court to examine a prior nonconforming use at a recreational park open to the community. Hunterstown Ruritan Club (the “Club”) sought to expand its go-carting operations to include racing on Sundays. While the Straban Township Zoning Hearing Board (the “Board”) prevented the Club from doing after deeming it impermissible because it was not a use reflected in the Club’s certificate of nonconformance, the Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Club’s previous racing events on Sundays entitled it to protection.
The applicant owned property in the city of Bethlehem, which was zoned RT High Density Residential. The applicant operated a deli on the property, which was a nonconforming use. The deli had been in business since the board approved a change in the use of the property from insurance office to a deli in 1998. The deli began operating at a loss in 2010. The applicant sought to expand the deli to a restaurant, which the applicant argued was a reasonable use of the property, for the survival of the business.
This dispute required the Third Circuit to determine whether or not a “speech buffer” surrounding abortion clinics was constitutional. The ordinance creating this buffer (the Ordinance) was passed in 2005 and prohibits congregating, patrolling, picketing, or demonstrating within fifteen feet “from any entrance to [a] hospital and or health care facility.” The court vacated the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, reasoning that the City of Pittsburgh failed its burden to show that the Ordinance was the least restrictive method of achieving its goal.
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